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By Philip B. Kurland
A delicate line divides a popular victory from a divine right.
It is a distinction too many Presidents have ignored

The
Imperial Mandate
Sir Robert Peel once wrote: "Infamous as Robespierre
and Marat unquestionably are, it would be no easy matter to assign each their due share of infamy without a
very dispassionate enquiry into many minute events
which contributed to shape their course, and into the
degrees of conflicting dangers between which they had
to choose." The same thought may be ventured about
Richard Nixon. No such "dispassionate enquiry" has yet
been afforded to us by either the popular or the academic press. If and when it is forthcoming, it is no more
likely to change the judgment about Nixon's infamy than
it did history's judgment on Marat or Robespierre. For
historical judgments, like judicial judgments, are seldom
based on data. But we pretend.
Nixon's defenders of the moment, like William Safire
and Patrick Buchanan, were once paid by him for their
services as apologists and continue so to act through the
good graces of the very news media that they once
damned. But Nixon cannot be defended by a refusal to
accept established facts without an explanation of them
or an addition to them. Nor will the judgment on Nixon
be affected by the argument that Nixon was only the
latest of a long line of perfidious presidents. Victor Lasky
is surely right in the title of his latest book, It Didn't
Start with Watergate. Unfortunately, his next book may
well be titled It Didn't End with Watergate, which would
be a better defense. But it should be remembered that it
didn't start with Charles I, either, nor did it end with
him.
Nixon may one day be succored the way Caesar was by
Marc Antony. But none of Nixon's defenders has yet
displayed the gifts of Antony's ghost writer. And it will
probably take a poet, even if one of smaller magnitude,
From Watergate and the Constitution by Philip B. Kurland. @ 1978 by the
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to make out the case for Nixon. Yet, even Antony speaking through Shakespeare conceded:
The noble Brutus
Hath told you Caesar was ambitious;
If it were so, it was a grievous fault;
And grievously hath Caesar answered it.
It seems to be harder for academics than for poets to
avoid self-righteousness, not to be disdainful of those
who are professionally engaged in politics or business,
which most of us eschew, except as kibitzers. Politicians'
motives, especially, cannot be nearly so pure as our own,
and hindsight constantly demonstrates to us the fallibility, if not venality, of those persons in the "real world."
In criticizing their efforts, we tend to assume an omniscience that only newspaper writers or television commentators are, by their nature, entitled to assert. But it
nevertheless remains the function of academics to aspire
to the "dispassionate enquiry" of which Sir Robert Peel
spoke.
Attempting-without entire success-to put to one
side my long and deep-seated distaste for the person of
Richard Nixon, I conclude that the best reasons for
Nixon's removal from office are not to be found in the
three articles of impeachment voted by the House Judiciary Committee or even in all five of those that the committee considered. This is not to say that these charges
were inadequate for impeachment and conviction. It is
rather that, just as Watergate was but the symbol of the
problems of the imperial presidency, so too were the impeachment articles but the symbols of Watergate. If
there were no more to Watergate than concealment of a
crime, lying about it, and refusing to respond to congressional demands for information, it could not have been
the traumatic event that it was. The impeachment
charges will always remain as proof of malversations
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The Articles were not the reason to impeach. They symbolized
Watergate, just as Watergate symbolized an imperial presidency
unique to President Nixon, but to concentrate only on
these issues is to exalt shadows and demean substance.
The President's trespasses were recorded not in the
bills of indictment but in the evidence from which they
were adduced. The published Watergate tapes and the
published volumes of evidence before the House Judiciary Committee revealed not only the criminality of a
President of the United States but also his immorality or,
more properly perhaps, his amorality.
When Nixon took to the air to excuse his behavior in
his initial interview with David Frost in May of 1977, the
New York Times wrote an uncharacteristically acute
editorial, displaying more doubts than editorial writers
are usually willing to acknowledge:
Watergate exposed an enduring dilemma that explains a strength of the Presidency but also says much
about excess .... To become President requires calculation, single-mindedness and ferocity, qualities
which can, abruptly, become far less admirable after
an election, depending on the character of the man.
Even if the electorate judges character wisely, not
even the most upright President can wholly immunize
himself against the compulsions of office.
The nation has, so far, responded to this dilemma
with a tide of reform ....
Are such reforms adequate? Cynics already wonder
whether they will not quickly degenerate into perfunctory piety. Some legislators seem resigned to enacting
lifeless monuments to a fleeting national attention
span. It will take years to find out; the ultimate
Watergate trial lies ahead. It will test not our capacity
to blame Richard Nixon but our ability to monitor and
adjust the checks and balances we profess to be
precious-to understand the infectious imperatives of
power.
Therein lie the basic constitutional problems that beg
for attention if our Watergate experience is to be a
lesson learned. As a second-class poet put it in a secondclass poem:
And when midst fallen London, they survey
The stone where Alexander's ashes lay,
Shall own with humbled pride the lesson just
By Time's slow finger written in the dust.
Or, to stick to Shakespeare:
I shall the effect of this good lesson keep,
As watchman to my heart.
The question remains, however, What is the lesson to
be learned from Watergate? We can readily say that the
evils revealed were the failure of our system of checks
and balances to inhibit the imperial presidency and the
abuse of governmental institutions for the personal
gratification of the President. But how was Nixon's presidency different from those of his predecessors and how
must it differ from those of his successors?
Arthur Schlesinger put forth a cogent thesis about the
special nature of the Nixon presidency:
As one examined the impressive range of Nixon's
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initiatives-from his appropriation of the war-making
power to his interpretation of the appointing power,
from his unilateral determination of social priorities to
his unilateral abolition of statutory programs, from his
attack on legislative privilege to his enlargement of
executive privilege, from his theory of impoundment
to his theory of the pocket veto, from his calculated
disparagement of the cabinet and his calculated discrediting of the press to his carefully organized concentration of federal management in the White House
-from all this a larger design ineluctably emerged. It
was hard to know whether Nixon, whose style was
banality, understood consciously where he was heading. He was not a man given to political philosophizing. But he was heading toward a new balance of constitutional powers, an audacious and imaginative
reconstruction of the American Constitution....
...It may be that he was the first President in
American history to conclude that the separation of
powers had so frustrated government on behalf of the
majority that the constitutional system had become
finally intolerable-and to move boldly to change the
system. For Congress, it could be argued, had failed
majority government in the high-technology society. It
had proved itself incapable of the swift decisions
demanded by the twentieth century. It could not make
intelligent use of its war-making authority. It had no
ordered means of setting national priorities or of controlling aggregate spending. It was not to be trusted
with secrets. It was fragmented, parochial, selfish,
cowardly, without dignity, discipline or purpose. The
Presidency had not stolen its power; rather Congress
had surrendered it out of fear of responsibility and
recognition of incapacity. Congress was even without
pride and, if ignored or disdained, waited humbly by
the White House and licked the hand of its oppressor.
Then, providing the philosophical framework of which
Nixon was not conscious, Schlesinger undertook to set
forth the theory of government that Nixon's actions
revealed:
What Nixon was moving toward was something different: it was not a parliamentary regime but a plebiscitary Presidency. His model lay not in Britain but in
France-in the France of Louis Napoleon and Charles
de Gaulle. A plebiscitary Presidency, unlike a parliamentary regime, would not require a new Constitution; presidential acts, confirmed by a Supreme Court
of his own appointment, could put a new gloss on the
old one. And a plebiscitary Presidency could be seen
as the fulfillment of constitutional democracy. Michels
explained in PoliticalPartiesthe rationale of the "personal dictatorship conferred by the people in accordance with constitutional rules." By the plebiscitary
logic, "once elected, the chosen of the people can no
longer be opposed in any way. He personifies the majority and all resistance to his will is anti-democratic .... He is, moreover, infallible, for 'he who is
elected by six million votes, carries out the will of the

people; he does not betray them.'" How much more
infallible if elected by 46 million votes! If opposition
became irksome, it was the voters themselves, "we are
assured, who demand from the chosen of the people
that he should use severe repressive measures, should
employ force, should concentrate all authority in his
own hands." The chief executive would be, as Laboulaye said of Napoleon III, "democracy personified, the
nation made man."
Any doubts about the validity of Schlesinger's thesis
may seem to have been put to rest by Nixon himself in a
third television interview with David Frost that was
broadcast on May 19, 1977. In that broadcast he
unashamedly announced that the President, like the
ancient kings of England, could do no wrong. What was
a crime when committed by others was legal if done by
the President, or by the members of his staff to whom he
had issued orders or given permission to ignore the laws
and Constitution of the United States.
If there is no doubt about the accuracy of Schlesinger's conclusion, there is still some problem with his
analysis. For the fact is that the "plebiscitary Presidency" has long been justified and advocated by many, if
not all, of our academic students of the presidency. It is
well described by Clinton Rossiter in his appropriately
entitled book, Constitutional Dictatorship, and
reiterated later in The American Presidency. It is the
direction of Harold Laski as early as 1940, in The
American President. One can read similar directions in
Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power and Louis
Koenig's The Chief Executive, as well as Louis Heren's
flattery of the presidency that resembles the rule of the
kings of England for a century after Magna Carta.
Clearly, Schlesinger is right in his assertion that Nixon
lacked the contemplative state of mind to define the
"plebiscitary Presidency" which was the unstated
premise of his actions. But there really was no need for
him to provide such a rationalization. "Liberal" scholars
had long since justified his notions of the scope of the
presidential power, although when they did so, they did
not have Nixon in mind, but rather Roosevelt and
Kennedy.
When one examines the rhetoric of presidential campaigns, both before and after Watergate, it may be readily noted that all the candidates assume the validity of
the "plebiscitary Presidency." Each candidate speaks of
what he will do when elected to office, on the assumption
that all power over foreign and domestic affairs falls into
the hands of the victor. The speech is not in terms of
leadership but in terms of command. And the public is
called upon to choose between the candidates in the expectation that its choice will not be the representative of
the people but the surrogate for the people. Even if the
Supreme Court no longer speaks of the people as sovereign, the Court is still bemused by the notion of separation of powers, however often it has sustained presidential overreaching. It has not yet succumbed to the
language of a constitutional "plebiscitary Presidency."
Surely, it had not yet done so in the 1950s, when it
uttered its major ruling on separation of powers.
In 1952, in reviewing and rejecting the constitutionality of a presidential seizure of the American steel mills,
which purported to be an exercise of presidential power
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that rested, in part at least, on the constitutionally
specified authority of commander-in-chief and the constitutionally implied powers over foreign relations, the
Court's opinion, written by Justice Black, stated:
The President's power, if any, to issue the order
must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself. There is no statute that expressly
authorizes the President to take possession of property
as he did here....
...it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from
the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution....
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander
in Chief... [The Government attempts to do so by
citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in
military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting
in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us
here....
]
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of
the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of
our Constitution, the President's power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is
to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending
of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks
bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President
is to execute.
In the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Frankfurter displayed a healthier respect for separation of powers than
he had shown as Professor Frankfurter. With the responsibility for judgment on his shoulders, he wrote:
A constitutional democracy like ours is perhaps the
most difficult of man's social arrangements to manage
successfully.... If a society is to be at once cohesive
and civilized, [there is a] need for limitations on the
power of governors over the governed....
To that end they rested the structure of our central
government on the system of checks and balances. For
them the doctrine of separation of powers was not
mere theory; it was a felt necessity. Not so long ago it
was fashionable to find our system of checks and
balances obstructive to effective government. It was
easy to ridicule that system as outmoded-too easy.
The experience through which the world has passed in
our own day has made vivid the realization that the
Framers of our Constitution were not inexperienced
doctrinaires ....The accretion of dangerous power
does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly,
from the generative force of unchecked disregard of
the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority.
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Nixon's attempt to stack a "strict constructionist" Court was
nothing new. FDR had already set a perfect example
And, indeed, it was "the generative force of unchecked
disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most
disinterested assertion of authority" that faced the nation with the crisis of Watergate.
The strongest and weightiest opinion in the Steel
Seizure Case was written by Justice Jackson. Because of
his experience as a member of the executive branch
under President Roosevelt, he was given to weighing
such experience more heavily than he would Black's
commitment to the language of the Constitution, or
Frankfurter's commitment to what Jackson termed "doctrine and legal fiction." But even he, who, when attorney
general, wrote a book in which he had chastised the
Court for allowing the Constitution to interfere with the
administration of government, reached the same conclusion as Black and Frankfurter as to the necessity for confining each branch to its proper role. It was "checks and
balances" more than "separation of powers" that
guided his decision: "The actual art of governing under
our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial
definitions of the power of any of its branches based on
isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context .... [The Constitution] enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with
those of Congress."
Jackson also met and rejected the argument of necessity, that emergency situations license the executive to
meet them as he sees fit:
In view of the ease, expedition and safety with
which Congress can grant and has granted large
emergency powers, certainly ample to embrace this
crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument that
we should affirm possession of them without statute.
Such power either has no beginning or it has no end.
If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint. I am
not alarmed that it would plunge us straightway into
dictatorship, but it is at least a step in that wrong
direction.
... Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head in whose choice the whole
Nation has a part, making him the focus of public
hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and
finality his decisions so far overshadow any others that
almost alone he fills the public eye and ear. No other
personality in public life can begin to compete with
him in access to the public mind through modern
methods of communications. By his prestige as head
of state and his influence upon public opinion he
exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to
check and balance his power which often cancels their
effectiveness.
I cannot be brought to believe that this country
will suffer if the Court refuses further to aggrandize
the presidential office, already so potent and so
relatively immune from judicial review, at the expense
of Congress.
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But I have no illusion that any decision by this
Court can keep power in the hands of Congress if it is
not wise and timely in meeting its problems. A crisis
that challenges the President equally, or perhaps
primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there
was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The tools belong to the man who can use
them." We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only
Congress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers.
The essence of our free Government is "leave to live
by no man's leave, underneath the law"-to be governed by those impersonal forces which we call law.
Our Government is fashioned to fulfill this concept so
far as humanly possible. The Executive, except for
recommendation and veto, has no legislative
power.... With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long
preserving free government except that the Executive
be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But
it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give
them up.
At least as of a quarter-century ago, it was clear that,
whether on the premises of constitutional language,
which were Black's, on the premises of constitutional
doctrine, which were Frankfurter's, or on the premises of
the realities of free government, which were Jackson's,
the Court rejected the concept of the "plebiscitary Presidency," the investment of the sovereignty of the nation
in the chief executive.
Even if the validity of the "plebiscitary Presidency" is
rejected, however, there remains the question what actions taken by Nixon as charged by Schlesinger are innovations in presidential government to support the proposition that Nixon "was heading toward a new balance
of constitutional powers, an audacious and imaginative
reconstruction of the American Constitution." For it
would seem that the catalog of usurpations stated by
Schlesinger reveal no exercises of presidential authority
not performed by Nixon's predecessors in office. A
review of each of the charges would be too cumbersome
for inclusion here. Examples suffice to show that Nixon
was not an innovator but a follower in the untoward expansion of the presidential office.
Thus, with reference to Nixon's appropriation of the
war-making power it is certainly most difficult to charge
him with assuming authority not exercised by his predecessors. The Vietnam War was initiated by President
Kennedy with full knowledge that it must expand if even
a small military force were sent to aid the South Vietnamese. And it was President Johnson who elevated the
Vietnam expedition into a full-blown war, without congressional approval and, indeed, with misrepresentations
to both the people and the Congress of what was going
on, the most notorious of these incidents being that

which called forth the Tonkin Bay Resolution. President
Truman brought the country into the Korean War
without so much as a "by your leave" to Congress.
Eisenhower invaded Lebanon. Abraham D. Sofaer has
recently published a diligent, scholarly study of many
similar presidential actions in our earliest history.
At the time of the Korean "police action," a letter appeared in the New York Times defending it against attack by Senator Robert A. Taft:
Senator Taft in his speech on Jan. 5 made the flat
statement that President Truman "had no authority
whatever to commit American troops to Korea without
consulting Congress and without Congressional approval"; and, further, that he "has no power to agree
to send American troops to fight in Europe in a war
between the members of the Atlantic Pact and Soviet
Russia." When he sent troops to Korea, Senator Taft
continued, "the President simply usurped authority,
in violation of the laws and the Constitution."
Senator Taft's statements are demonstrably irresponsible. The public is entitled to know what provisions of the law or of the Constitution have been
violated by President Truman in sending troops
overseas. From the day that President Jefferson
ordered Commodore Dale and two-thirds of the
American Navy into the Mediterranean to repel the
Barbary pirates American Presidents have repeatedly
committed American armed forces abroad without
prior Congressional consultation or approval....
Until Senator Taft and his friends succeed in
rewriting American history according to their own
specifications these facts must stand as obstacles to
their efforts to foist off their current political prejudices as eternal American verities.
The author of that letter was Arthur Schlesinger. He did
not stand alone in this position. For another, Henry
Steele Commager argued the same point.
None of this relieves Nixon of the fact that he, too, carried on a war-indeed, secretly extended it into Cambodia-as though Congress did not exist, often lying or
telling half-truths both to Congress and to the people.
And, perhaps, it should be noted that both Johnson and
Truman surrendered their party's hold on the presidency because of the furor created by their war-making activities. But it remains the fact that Nixon did not conceive or create this abuse of presidential power; he had a
long line of precedents.
Nixon's pique at the rejection by the Senate of his
Supreme Court nominations of Judges Carswell and
Haynsworth, which resulted in his statement that the
Senate confirmation should have been proforma, hardly
rises to the action of a "plebiscitary Presidency." Nor
did his efforts to secure a Supreme Court of his own persuasion, for which Franklin Roosevelt had set such an excellent example.
Nixon's refusal to deliver data to the Congress at its
demand was hardly an innovation, although it was probably the first time data was denied to a House impeachment inquiry. But, then, it was the first time such a committee had made such a demand. And the Supreme
Court did conclude, for the first time, that there was such
a thing as a constitutionally derived executive privilege,
albeit a conditional one, not assertable against a criminal

court subpoena, however effective it may still prove to be
against congressional demands.
Nixon's calculated disparagement of the cabinet is,
again, hardly new. The cabinet is not a constitutional office or body. The dismissal of cabinet officers who refused to do the President's bidding is of ancient vintage,
never so clearly exercised as by President Jackson when
he had to fire two secretaries of the Treasury, Louis
McLane and William J. Duane, to get one, Roger B.
Taney, who would remove the government's deposits
from the Bank of the United States. The cabinet has long
since ceased to be an advisory body or one, like its namesake in Great Britain, where government policy is debated and resolved by the taking of opinions.
The Nixon cabinet and his treatment of it is probably
the least vulnerable to attack of any of the charges
against his undue assertion of power. Harold Laski properly put the role of the American cabinet in the same
category of limited importance:
While it is true that it has attracted men of the first
eminence, like Jefferson and Hamilton, into its ranks,
it has rarely been an effective team, and its formal
subordination to the president has meant that it has
never been, in a really continuous way, a policymaking body. The president may or may not consult it,
as he chooses; he may or may not compose it of men of
national standing.
Nixon chose not to consult his cabinet and chose, with
few exceptions, not to "compose it of men of national
standing." But the discretion was legitimately his,
whichever way he chose to exercise it. Not within the
memory of living Americans has the cabinet played a
substantial part in the governance of the nation, except
through the administrative roles of heads of departments, for which constitutional provision exists.
Similarly with the charge that Nixon "carefully
organized concentration of federal management in the
White House." The office of the White House was not a
Nixon creation; it derived from Franklin D. Roosevelt's
reorganization plan.
Under the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson and
Nixon, the White House staff more than doubled and
President Carter has not seriously diminished this
number, in spite of talk about reducing the size of the
White House bureaucracy. At last count the Carter
White House staff numbered 590. In the Roosevelt,
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and
Ford administrations, the assistants to the President and
other members of the White House staff became assistant presidents, assuming control and disposition of matters submitted for presidential decision. They issued
orders at their own discretion to departmental chiefs and
even lesser bureaucrats in the executive branch. Under
Nixon, this circle was not merely a source of advice and
analysis, it became a force that closed off the President
from access by all other government officials, and the
President from access to others than the White House
staff. The sanctum sanctorum of the Oval Office became
a reality during the time of the Nixon presidency.
Once again, however, we do not have Nixon as the inventor of a device for the attainment of the "plebiscitary
Presidency," but only its extrapolator. The opponents of
the Roosevelt plan for the reorganization of the White
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All Presidents claim a "plebiscitary Presidency." It is as if they
are omnipotent. Their talk is not of leadership, but of command
House anticipated the evils of the present form of the
White House office. Their views were derided as a phantasm of imaginary evils. Those imaginary evils have
turned out to be real ones. But they neither originated
with Nixon, nor have they disappeared with his disappearance from office.
Surely, too, Nixon's relationships with the fourth
estate were accurately described by Schlesinger as
"calculated discrediting of the press." It was an enmity
between the press and the presidency that has also had
its precedents.
Writing of Thomas Jefferson, Leonard Levy said:
By the time he left the presidency, a much wiser and
embittered man, so convinced was he that the press
was hopelessly abandoned to falsehoods and licentiousness-epithetical standards relinquished by libertarian theorists-that he professed to believe that it
was doing more harm to the nation than would result
from suppression. "I deplore, with you," he wrote to a
correspondent, "the putrid state into which our
newspapers have passed, and the malignity, the
vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who write for
them; and I enclose you a recent sample ... as a proof
of the abyss of degradation into which we have fallen.
These ordures," he exclaimed-forgetting that the
press mirrored American culture and the people whom
he professed, in moments of intellectual isolation, to
trust-"are rapidly depraving the public taste, and
lessening its relish for sound food. As vehicles of information, and a curb on our functionaries, they have
rendered themselves useless, by forfeiting all title to
belief." The violence and malignity of party spirit, he
thought, was the cause of the press's fall from grace.
The history of the New Deal is a history of conflict
between Roosevelt and the press. While Kennedy like
other Presidents had his media favorites, paid with
presidential inside information, he too had a running
battle with at least some of the media. If Johnson
watched three television sets at one time, it was not out
of affection for the newscasting, but to deplore its content. If there is presidential paranoia in this relationship,
it is not without cause. While Roosevelt could go over the
heads of the Congress to the people through the medium
of radio, the medium of television has gone over the
heads of the Congress and the President to the people.
Television has tended to destroy Congress by ignoring
it, or by so selecting those aspects of its business for
broadcast as to make it impotent in its conflict with the
President, any President. Douglass Cater has written of
all journalism:
Communications media have a vast power to shape
government-both its policies and its leaders. This is
not an editorial-page power. It is the power to selectout of the tens of thousands of words spoken in Washington each day and the tens of dozens of eventswhich words and events are projected for mankind to
see. Equally powerful is the media's capacity to ig-
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nore; those words and events that fail to get projected
might as well not have occurred.
Surely the case can be made out that there were Nixon
administration threats to the freedom of the press. The
defenders of the press "pointed to the administration's
suggestions that public concern about media bias would
lead to demands for antitrust action, its repeated complaints about news distortion, its wiretapping of journalists, the wave of subpoenas commanding journalists
to testify about news sources, the thinly veiled threats to
make political use of the FCC's power of licensing broadcasters, and the FBI investigation of CBS news correspondent Daniel Schorr."
But it was not only the Nixon government that regarded the press as its adversary. The "new journalism"
that eschewed objectivity in favor of "Truth" also came
to regard the government as the enemy and fashioned
their stories accordingly, as Benno Schmidt writes:
Daniel Moynihan ... decried in a widely read article
what he regarded as the systematic hostility of journalists in the national media to the institution of the
presidency. He ascribed much of this hostility to the
fact that the national media "thought to improve itself
by recruiting more and more persons from middleand upper-class backgrounds and trained at the universities associated with such groups." Moynihan contended that these recruits from the "adversary
culture" infused their elitist, anti-Establishment attitudes into the national media. The muckraking heritage of American journalism, which in the past had
been a small part of the overall tradition, has been inflated by dramatic instances of government deceit into
a general attitude that exposing the seamy side of official acts is the optimum in successful reporting.
Moynihan claimed that the result was a decline in
journalistic objectivity, a harmful condition that is
worsened by the absence of any tradition of self-correction in the American press.
Yes, Nixon abused the press and, implicitly or explicitly, threatened it with illegal sanctions. His stand was
more forceful than Kennedy's cancellation of White
House subscriptions to the now-defunct Herald-Tribune.
But it must also be conceded that the press has abused a
presidency that it always opposed. Its complaint that
Nixon refused to confide in it can hardly be regarded as
evidence of a failure to confine the presidency within appropriate bounds. Had he done otherwise, he would surely have been accused of attempting to manipulate the
press.
The press regards itself as the governor of our government. So long as it insists on playing this role, it should
be clear that we have almost as much to fear from an imperial press as we have to fear from an imperial presidency. Both have the capacity to reduce government to
the agency of a single group, in a society with a government that was framed to respond to a multiplicity of
organized and unorganized constituencies. It is, per-

haps, unfortunate that it was Spiro Agnew who made the
point that the spokesmen for the media were elected by
none and represent none other than themselves. The fact
remains that the voices of the Associated Press, and the
United Press International, of ABC, NBC and CBS,
sound like but a single voice, not only in the editorial
positions that they espouse but in the selection of news
that they choose to publish and the way it is presented.
And when the New York Times, the Washington Post,
the Los Angeles Times, Time magazine and Newseek
speak with that same voice-all in opposition to presidential government-as they certainly did during the
Nixon era, his paranoia is understandable, even if his actions were indefensible.
Until the press returns to some concept of objectivity-the duty to tell the facts, all of the facts, and nothing
but the facts-the First Amendment may continue to
guarantee its freedom but not its responsibility. It may
be hard for the viewer or reader or listener to distinguish
fact from opinion, but that should be within the competence of a press with professional standards. The
modern-day media, however, must be recognized as the
inheritors of the partisan traditions of eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century journalism, except that then each
newspaper represented a different faction, whereas now
they all seem to represent a single faction. The modern
problem of the press lies primarily not in its editorializing but in its news reporting.
None of this affords a defense of Nixon's treatment of
the press. An "imperial president," however, would not
choose to destroy the press's freedom by threatening it,
but rather by co-opting it, as the Kennedy administration
almost succeeded in doing. Surely an approving press is
a better ally for a "plebiscitary Presidency" than an
adversary press. If Nixon failed to realize that and work
toward it, however, it revealed only more bad judgment
on his part and not an absence of cupidity for illegitimate power.
Schlesinger also complained of Nixon's arrogation of
authority in "his unilateral determination of social
priorities." Certainly this is an important element in the
"plebiscitary Presidency." Equally certain is that this
was not an innovation on the part of Nixon. Thus, for example, Richard Neustadt wrote of Eisenhower's "unilateral determination of social priorities" in approving
terms:
Early in 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
presented to the Congress-and the country and his
party-some 65 proposals for new legislation, over
and above appropriations....
Throughout, one theme was emphasized: here was a
comprehensive and coordinated inventory of the nation's current legislative needs, reflecting the President's own judgments, choices, and priorities in every
major area of Federal action; in short, his "legislative
program," an entity distinctive and defined, its
coverage and its omissions, both, delimiting his stand
across the board ....
Thus, one year after his inaugural, Eisenhower
espoused a sweeping concept of the President's initiative in legislation and an elaborate mechanism for its
public expression; developments which no one seemed
to take amiss. Both in governmental circles and in the

press, the whole performance was regarded almost as a
matter of course, a normal White House response to
the opening of Congress. The pattern, after all, was
quite familiar; the comprehensive program expressed
in ordered sequence, with some sort of publicized
preliminaries and detailed follow-up, had been an annual enterprise in Truman's time. Indeed, while
Eisenhower had undoubtedly improved upon the
earlier mechanics, his 1954 procedure seemed expressive less of innovation than of reversion to accustomed
practice....
Traditionally, there has been a tendency to distinguish "strong" Presidents from "weak," depending
on their exercise of the initiative in legislation. The
personal appearances in the hall of the House, the
special messages, the drafted bills, the public appeals,
so characteristic of contemporary program presentation, have all been represented in the past-no farther
back than Franklin Roosevelt's time-as signs of a
President's intention or capacity to "dominate" the
Congress. If these were once relevant criteria of domination, they are not so today. As things stand now
they have become part of the regular routines of office, an accepted elaboration of the constitutional
right to recommend; as such, no more indicative of
presidential domination than the veto power, say, in
Herbert Hoover's time.
Once again we see that the tools for the execution of
the "plebiscitary Presidency" were not Nixon creations.
Nixon revealed not a capacity for innovation but only a
capacity for imitation. What he did do was to utilize
devices created by predecessors, who used them sparingly, while he used them persistently; who used them in
isolation, while he used them in combination; who used
them unsuccessfully, while he used them successfully, until they failed him in the end.
He was an innovator, however, in a way that showed
less imitation of his presidential predecessors than of
governors of less democratic nations. He created a presidential, political police force; he rejected the basic concept of Anglo-American political freedom, the rule of
law. And he effected both these changes in American
political tradition-deeply imbedded in the Constitution-through the device of the White House office.
Nixon's creation of the White House political police
and the perversion of the security agencies to his political needs did not derive from a desire to be perverse, or
even from dreams of glory. They were evoked by fear, the
fear of the marchers on Washington, of the despoilers of
universities, of the burners of cities, of the bombers,
many of whom he correctly regarded as the scions of the
eastern establishment. Revolution invokes suppression;
force is met by force; conspiracy responds to conspiracy.
Nixon did not act here, he reacted. And his reaction took
the form of a lawlessness no less reprehensible-certairly more reprehensible because of his office-than
the lawlessness he was seeking to put down. As Justice
Jackson once told us: "Security is like liberty in that
many are the crimes committed in its name." Worse, in
Nixon's case, he undertook to substitute himself and his
personal staff for the police and the courts to determine
what conduct he thought deserved sanction because he
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The proposition that what a President does is implicitly legal
is no less than the stuff of King Charles I and Big Brother
disapproved of it, not because it was illegal. "L'etat,
c'est moi."
Nixon's primary Watergate evils consist of his violations of the rule of law as we and our common law brethren have come to know it. Dicey's classic statement of the
English constitution summarizes the first two of the
three essentials of the rule of law in this way:
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy
or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence
of arbitrariness, or prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government....
It means, again, equality before the law, or the
equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of
the land administered by the ordinary law courts; the
"rule of law" in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from. the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from
the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.
Nixon violated the rule of law to make war on a large
part of the presidential constituency. It will be remembered that King Charles was charged with subverting the
"fundamental laws of the land" and confounding "the
liberties and the property of England." And as C. V.
Wedgwood has said:
The King's friends might argue that the King had
made war only in defence of his rights. But, rightly or
wrongly, he had made war on his subjects, and in the
crudest possible manner this was a violation of the
fundamental bond between him and his people.
There are some who are concerned that Nixon's actions be recognized, not only as unconstitutional and illegal, but as immoral, and uniquely immoral:
There is something unresolved in our attitude toward
him. A major source of this anxiety is that we have
never been able to answer the question of the extent to
which Nixon, elected by us, is made in our image....
This is why the term "Nixon-haters" still carries a
sting; this is why allegations no matter how clumsily
put forth, or how righteously used as a justification-that Nixonian ethics have for a long time guided people in power are so unsettling .... [W]e have an imperative need to reach back into ourselves for some
sense of principle by which to measure and judge
him by which to distinguish ourselves from him. We
need to know whether such a sense of principle really
exists. We are still not sure whether it is just Nixon
who is morally bankrupt or the culture at large, and so
we are compelled to test ourselves against Nixon in
order to find out.
Theirs is essentially a plea for absolution by those who
would themselves indulge illegalities and unconstitutionalities in the deep-seated belief that they, but not
Nixon, are entitled to exemption from legal sanctions
because of a call to respond to a higher order. Surely
there is a difference between law and ethics or morality.
Justice Jackson spoke to the point, in a different context:
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We should not forget that criminality is one thing a
matter of law-and that morality, ethics and religious
teachings are another. Their relations have puzzled
the best of men. Assassination, for example, whose
criminality no one doubts, has been the subject of
serious debate as to its morality. This does not make
crime less criminal, but it shows on what treacherous
grounds we tread when we undertake to translate
ethical concepts into legal ones, case by case. We
usually end up by condemning all that we personally
disapprove and for no better reason than that we
disapprove it. In fact, what better reason is there?
It should be recognized, however, that in an open
society there is a moral duty to obey the law. Acts committed with political motivations are not-the less criminal
because of such motivations, but they cannot be made
into crimes because of those motives. And certainly,
whatever the moral justifications for civil disobedience,
the narrow nature of the legitimacy of that concept must
be kept in mind. Civil disobedience does not encompass
the violation of law as a means of protest. At most it
justifies disobedience of a particular law the validity of
which it seeks to challenge and test both against legal
norms and community standards. Civil disobedience cannot encompass violations of other laws as a form of protest against the law sought to be challenged.
Certainly civil disobedience affords no justification for
violation of the laws by government officials. They cannot hold office under an oath to support the Constitution
and laws of the United States and, at the same time,
assert a right to violate the Constitution and the laws. As
Professor Bickel put it:
There is a moral duty, and there ought to be, for
those to whom it is applicable-most often officers of
government-to obey the manifest constitution, unless
and until it is altered by the amendment process it
itself provides for, a duty analogous to the duty to
obey final judicial decrees. No president may decide
to stay in office for a term of six years rather than four,
or, since the Twenty-second Amendment, to run for a
third term. There is an absolute duty to obey; to
disobey is to deny the idea of constitutionalism, that
special kind of law which establishes a set of preexisting rules within which society works out all its
other rules from time to time. To deny this idea is in
the most fundamental sense to deny the idea of law
itself.
It was the denial of "the idea of law itself" that was
Nixon's most egregious offense. And none need seek further than his own words to establish his guilt. His incapacity to understand the enormity of his proposition,
"When the President does it, that means that it is not illegal," reflects immorality as well as paranoia. And it is
this that none of his defenders can discount. It is this
that justifies the removal of a president no less than of a
king. It is the ultimate rejection of the validity of this rationale that will prevent the American president from
becoming Louis Heren's twelfth-century English king or

Orwell's "Big Brother."
Bickel, in imitation of Burke, said:
In order to survive, be coherent and stable, and
answer to men's wants, a civil society had to rest on a
foundation of moral values. Else it degenerated-if an
oligarchy, into interest government, a government of
jobbers enriching themselves and their friends, and
ended in revolution; or if a full democracy, into a
mindless, shameless thing, freely oppressing various
minorities and ruining itself.
The Nixon administration partook of both dangers, tending toward a government of jobbers at the same time
that it sought to create majority rule without minority
rights. "Any true believer will want total power to
achieve the true ends of government, and will be a
democrat or an authoritarian depending, as Burke said,
on which scheme or system he thinks will bring him
nearer to total power."
Nixon and his White House office were guilty of
reaching for "total power" in a constitutional state that
recognized the need for dispersing and not concentrating governmental authority. Nixon and his White
House office were guilty of "corrupting the Constitution." And, if that is not a "high Crime and Misdemeanor," it should be. The lesson still to be learned,
however, is that the Constitution abhors a benevolent
despot no less than a malevolent one. As we continue to
keep watch on our government, we should do well not to
forget the equality of the rule of law that denies arbitrary
power to those we like no less than those we dislike. We
forget this-as we tended to forgive it in some of our
earlier Presidents-at our peril. It remains true that
"the price of liberty is eternal vigilance."
There are many possible inferences to-be derived from
the constitutional aspects of the Watergate affair. One
attitude is that of the generation of the "counterculture." It has been stated by Charles L. Mee in his recent book A Visit to Haldeman and Other States of Mind:
The ruins of our Republic lie about us, like shards of
some other ancient dead civilization....
Dare we admit that we did not at first notice? That
it died when no one was looking, and we scarcely
missed it for days or, it may even be, for years? We
only first noticed it, reluctantly, wishing not to see,
when Nixon buggered the works, and then buggered
those who went after him, a Bulgar holding out
against the hordes until at last, unimpeachable, he was
told he must step down-not by Congress and not by
the courts but by four-star General Haig in a pinch
play with Bad Kissinger. and then-oh, God, where is
our sense of shame?-pardoned by his handpicked
successor for crimes he protested he did not commit.
We said it proved the Republic worked, but we knew
that Republics are not saved when their constitutional
usages are forgotten or avoided and salvation depends
upon the accidents of a tape recording machine and
the wits of a four-star general. Machiavelli could not
do justice to this theme. Shakespeare's Richard II
could not weep copiously enough. We watched it play
itself out, with the nerves of dead men in a dead
Republic.
Was Mee wrong in his judgment? An alternative is the

reading long since given, years before the events of
Watergate, by a scholar-historian, Charles H. Mcllwain:
If the history of our constitutional past teaches
anything, it seems to indicate that the mutual suspicions of reformers and constitutionalists ... must be
ended if we are to keep and enlarge the liberties for
which our ancestors fought. Liberals must become
more constitutional than some of them are, constitutionalists must become more liberal than most of them
have been. We cannot get the needed redress of injustices' and abuses without reform, and we can never
make these reforms lasting and effective unless we
reduce them to the orderly processes of law. ...
We live under a written constitution which classifies
some things under jurisdictio, as legal fundamentals, . . . while it leaves other matters to the free discretion of the organs of positive government it has
created. The distribution of these matters between
jurisdictio and gubernaculum, made so many years
ago, is of course in constant need of revision by interpretation or by amendment .... But the surest
safeguard of a proper balance between the jurisdictio
and the gubernaculum-and that even in a government of the peopile as well asfor them-would seem to
consist in some such constitution containing some
such distribution. There is the problem of restriction
and the problem of responsibility, and practical
politics involves their interrelation .... The people
have now replaced the king in these political matters
of government; but even in a popular state, such as we
trust ours is, the problem of law versus will remains
the most important of all practical problems .... The
two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight
are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete
political responsibility of government to the governed.
Scholarly historians have seldom made good prophets.
The prophecies of the counterculture of the Sixties
reveal only self-indulgence. Both share responsibility for
the crisis of the imperial presidency. The former because
of their advocacy of the desirability of presidential
power; the latter because their nihilism and tactics contributed so largely to the reaction that was Watergate.
Surely there can be no return to the Jeffersonian idyll,
but the Hamiltonian king has not yet been ensconced.
The question is how many Americans are still, or may be
persuaded to become, adherents of the "vital center"
and of the rule of reason based on experience, both of
which guided the Founding Fathers to the framing of a
Constitution that we still purport to follow. It was the
poet Yeats who warned us against the events certain to
overtake us when "the centre cannot hold." It was the
artist Goya who graphically portrayed the consequences
of the abandonment of reason in one of his etchings inscribed, "The sleep of reason brings forth monsters."
There is yet hope. "And hope is brightest when it
dawns from fears." It is not fear of particular events, but
fear of the corruption of the Constitution that should
now provide us the motivating force for hope. "The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
qI
understanding."
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